Market panic on different time-scales by Borland, Lisa & Hassid, Yoan
Market panic on different time-scales
Lisa Borland
Evnine & Associates, Inc.
456 Montgomery Street, Suite 800, San Francisco, CA 94104, USA ∗
Yoan Hassid
Department of Statistics
Stanford University
November 13, 2018
Abstract
Cross-sectional signatures of market panic were recently discussed
on daily time scales in [1], extended here to a study of cross-sectional
properties of stocks on intra-day time scales. We confirm specific intra-
day patterns of dispersion and kurtosis, and find that the correlation
across stocks increases in times of panic yielding a bimodal distribu-
tion for the sum of signs of returns. We also find that there is memory
in correlations, decaying as a power law with exponent 0.05. During
the Flash-Crash of May 6 2010, we find a drastic increase in dispersion
in conjunction with increased correlations. However, the kurtosis de-
creases only slightly in contrast to findings on daily time-scales where
kurtosis drops drastically in times of panic. Our study indicates that
this difference in behavior is result of the origin of the panic-inducing
volatility shock: the more correlated across stocks the shock is, the
more the kurtosis will decrease; the more idiosyncratic the shock, the
lesser this effect and kurtosis is positively correlated with dispersion.
We also find that there is a leverage effect for correlations: negative
returns tend to precede an increase in correlations. A stock price feed-
back model with skew in conjunction with a correlation dynamics that
follows market volatility explains our observations nicely.
∗lisa@evafunds.com
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1 Introduction
We recently proposed a model with the goal of understanding the
evolution of the cross-sectional distribution and correlation dynam-
ics among stock returns, (adding to the existing literature of cross-
sectional studies, e.g [2]-[10]). Specifically, we described and mod-
eled the interesting interplay between dispersion, kurtosis and cross-
sectional correlations which we observed on daily time-scales. In that
work, we found a strong anti-correlation between cross-sectional dis-
persion and cross-sectional kurtosis in financial markets [1]. In partic-
ular we discovered that, in times of market panic, dispersion increases
drastically, as does volatility, while cross-sectional kurtosis drops close
to zero. In addition, various measures of cross-stock correlations in-
creases, inducing a bi-modal distribution of the cross-sectional sum of
signs of stock returns, implying that in such times all stocks tend to
move up or down together. To describe these findings we proposed a
phase-transition model, where the dynamics of correlations responded
to an external volatility shock, which could be interpreted as an in-
crease in fear and uncertainty among market participants. This model
describes very well all the stylized facts observed both in normal and
panic times, on daily time-scales.
We now extend our study to intra-day time scales, and also probe
some interesting questions which were prompted by the original work.
We wish to quantify any memory in the correlations, and also to see
if there are any detectable asymmetries in the dynamics of the corre-
lations. Indeed we find that correlation tend to increase more signif-
icantly after negative returns. We also find that the degree to which
the kurtosis decreases depends on whether the volatility shock to the
financial system is of an exogenous (market-wide) nature, or endoge-
nous (more stock-specific).
2 Intra day data: Cross-sectional prop-
erties
We showed previously [1] that market panic on daily time scales is
accompanied by high volatility, high dispersion, and low kurtosis. In
addition the sum of signs S follows a bimodal distribution as a result
of high correlations among stocks. Since it is difficult to calibrate
and check our model very carefully due to the lack of data and the
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Figure 1: The market wide average of intra day returns, sampled every 15
minutes.
relatively few instances of market panic historically, we instead look
toward smaller time scales where we have many more observations.
Our goal is to calculate the same quantities on these time scales and
to see if the signatures of panic persist.
A universe of 100 US stocks (belonging to the SP100) was sam-
pled at 15 minute intervals spanning the time period 2007-2009. The
market-wide average of this data is shown in Figure 1. Using this data,
we calculated cross-sectional dispersion and cross-sectional kurtosis on
15 minute time scales. First, it is interesting to notice the intra-day
seasonality that these quantities exhibit. In particular, the average
intra day dispersion is markedly bigger at the beginning of the day,
decreasing as time goes on. This result was shown also in [11] and
more recently in [12]. Kurtosis exhibits a less defined pattern, and the
sum of signs S shows some slight seasonality as well. These latter ob-
servations are however not as marked as for the dispersion (see Figure
2). More interesting details on the relationship of dispersion, kurtosis
and the index return are discussed in [12].
Bearing in mind the intra day seasonality, we show in Figure 3
the cross-sectional dispersion calculated at 15 minute time intervals
for the entire time period considered. We also show cross-sectional
kurtosis. Note that the correlation between the two does not exhibit
the strong anti-correlation that we saw on daily scales (Figure 4).
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Figure 2: Average intra day dispersion
On the contrary, the correlation is positive at 30%. Overnight data is
omitted in this study, so one hypothesis is that the largest contribution
to the decrease in kurtosis would come from overnight price moves.
We discuss this point in more detail later on; in fact understanding
why kurtosis and dispersion are negatively correlated on some time
scales while not on others is an interesting feature which we try to
understand and model 1
The next quantity that we look at is the normalized sum of signs
of returns (S) over a given 15 minute interval. We argued in [1] that
|S| is a good proxy for the correlations in the system. Intuitively, if
|S| is large (close to 1) , then all stocks will either go up or down
1We also want to point out that our study of the cross-sectional kurtosis on daily time-
scales [1] was performed on a universe of 2000 US stocks, whereas the intra-day studies
were just using 100 stocks.
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Figure 3: a) Cross-sectional dispersion calculated at 15 minute intervals and
b) cross-sectional kurtosis calculated at 15 minute intervals. In contrast to
daily data (Figure 4,) [1], there is in general no anti-correlation between
kurtosis and dispersion
Figure 4: Daily data shoes a strong anti-correlation between dispersion and
kurtosis.
together. Conversely, if |S| is small, there should be no particular
co-movement among stocks. As a result, we expect to see a uni-modal
distribution of S in normal times, and a bi-modal one in times of
panic. This is what we observed on daily time scales. We studied the
distribution of S calculated from our intra-day data and found the
same behavior: In times of panic, for example October 2008 (Figure
10), the distribution of S is bimodal. In normal times, for example
September 2008, the distribution of S is unimodal (Figure 11). The
fact that this property appears on multiple time scales prompts the
question: Is there memory in correlation? This question was actually
discussed in a recent paper [13] , but we argue here that their results
are not based on a fair definition of correlation.
We shall expand on this in the next section, but before doing so,
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Figure 5: The definition of AIC used in [13] is essentially the market volatility.
Figure 6: The cross-sectional sign correlation AIC calculated at 15 minute
intervals.
we wish to point out a possible criticism of our analysis: Note that
[6] a bimodal distribution can easily be obtained as an artifact of
conditioning on high volatility time points. In such a case one ”cherry-
picks” days (intervals) on which volatility was high, which by necessity
corresponds to those days on which more stocks moved in the same
direction, thus contributing to the higher absolute return over those
particular days. We believe that this is not the case in our study; we
do not”cherry-pick” certain days out of the sample, but are looking
at the general behavior of stock returns for all days in a region of
interest.
6
Figure 7: Memory in AIC on daily time scales.
3 Memory in correlations
In a recent paper, [13] studied the multi-fractal behavior of an average
cross-market correlation defined from the sum of pair-wise correlations
market-wide,
AICold =
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i
N∑
j>i
(ri− < ri >)(rj− < rj >)
σiσj
(1)
While interesting, upon closer inspection it is very clear that this
measure is essentially the index volatility if the σi and σj are taken
to be time series volatilities (see Figure 5). Hence, the nice results
obtained for correlation dynamics are already well-known from index
volatility studies.
Instead we define a correlation measure in the spirit of [13], yet
which we believe isolates correlation effects from volatility effects. It
is identical to Eq(1) ( assuming zero means), except that we take
σi = |ri| and σj = |rj | resulting in a sign-correlation function
AIC =
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i
N∑
j>i
(si)(sj) (2)
Note that any high frequency measure of correlation will suffer
from the Epps effect [14], which underestimates correlations due to
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Figure 8: Memory in AIC on 15 minute time scales.
asynchronous trading. However, we found that this could be safely
ignored at the 15 minute time scale resolution.
Using the data set of 100 US stocks described above, we calculated
at each time point the AIC as defined in Eq (2). A plot of AIC is
shown in Figure 6. It is interesting to note that this quantity, for a
large number N of stocks , is identically related to the square of a
naive measure of correlations S which we defined in a previous work,
S =
∑N
i sign(ri)
N
(3)
Because of this correspondence, we shall sometimes speak of S, some-
times of AIC, but essentially both are a proxy for the first-order cor-
relation among stock returns.
Using this simple statistic as a quantifier for correlations, we turn
our attention to the first of our questions, namely if there is memory
in correlations. We calculate the following quantity
Vaic(τ) =< (AIC(t)−AIC(t+ τ))2 > (4)
which is a variogram for the average instantaneous correlation. If
there is no memory in the system, then a plot of Vaic as a function
of the time lag τ will fluctuate around a straight line. However, this
is not the case, and our results indicate that there is a power law
decay of the instantaneous value of AIC as time increases. Similar
results for the memory in the volatility of individual stocks, as well as
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Figure 9: Histogram of sum of signs for 15 minute intervals during October
2008. Correlations are high and stocks move together.
that of the volatility in the market index have already been presented
in the literature [15]. Those quantities exhibit a long range memory
with power law decays of index 0.2 and 0.34 respectively. In the case
of AIC however, the memory is shorter-ranged , decaying with an
index γ empirically found to be on average around 0.03. Results for
the memory on daily time scales are shown in Figure 7 (γ = 0.05).
In Figure 8, the variogram of AIC sampled at 15 minute intervals is
shown (γ = 0.012). The evidence of memory in the system is very
clear, although the latter results contain a periodic pattern which is
the effect of a convolution with intra-day seasonality. In addition to
the variogram analysis, we also calculated the multi-fractal spectrum
for AIC, from which there is evidence of memory on different time-
scales. Fianlly, we looked at the distribution of the sum of signs S =
sqrtAIC for 15 minute intervals, for the months of September 2008
and October 2008 (Figures 9 and 10). Within our framework, the
bimodal distribution in October speaks to a panic phase.
9
Figure 10: The distribution of the sum of signs during September 2008, taken
at 15 minute intervals. The uni modal distribution implies that correlations
are on average low.
4 The Flash-Crash
On May 6 2010, market participants went in to a mini- panic as stocks
suddenly exhibited drastic negative returns, only to recover fully by
the end of the day. Much speculation to the cause of this behavior
points a finger at high frequency electronic trading algorithms. But
whatever the reason, it is clear that May 6 can be classified as a day
of market panic, referred to as the Flash Crash. For us, this is an
excellent scenario to study in the current framework.
In the days preceding and immediately following the Flash Crash,
we sampled data for 100 highly capitalized US stocks at 5 minute
intervals. We calculated cross-sectional dispersion and kurtosis, as
well as S and AIC. The plots in Figures 11-13 tell a nice story.
First we show the 5 minute market returns on May 6 2010. One
clearly sees how the volatility jumps after the large negative return.
Simultaneously , dispersion (whose intra day seasonality is very clear)
jumps to a high at the onset of the Flash Crash. Interestingly, kurtosis
remains roughy the same. Regarding S, it is apparent that on and in
the days following May 6 a bimodal distribution is attained. This can
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Figure 11: Intra day 5 minute returns for the time period around May 6 2010.
Note how the large negative return triggers an increase in the volatility.
be seen in Figure 14 where a histogram of the cross-sectional average
sum of signs after the Flash Crash is plotted, indicating that even
on this 5 minute time scale, correlations have increased and there are
signs of panic. Interpreting these results within the context of our
model, in particular the fact that kurtosis doesn’t decrease markedly
in the Flash Crash, is the topic of the following section and was also
discussed in [16].
5 Endogenous or Exogenous Volatil-
ity Shocks: Negative Returns or Exter-
nal Fear?
In our initial model [1] we hypothesized that market panic is triggered
by an external volatility shock. In other words, a global ”fear factor”
pushes the financial system into a collective mode of highly correlated
behavior, manifested by the fact that all stock returns will move in a
highly similar manner, going either all up or all down together. This
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Figure 12: Intra day dispersion for the time period around May 6 2010, sam-
pled at 5 minute intervals. Seasonality effects are apparent but nevertheless
there is a jump in dispersion at the onset of the Flash Crash
behavior is accompanied by an increase in volatility and an increase in
cross-sectional dispersion. On daily time scales, it was also accompa-
nied by a dramatic decrease in kurtosis. However, on intra day time
scales we have seen that the cross-sectional kurtosis need in fact not
decrease, while the other signatures of panic seem to hold true also on
these scales. We want to explore this phenomenon and understand it
in a little more detail.
Another point which we would like to understand better is if there
is any asymmetry in the correlation dynamics,. Basically we want to
see if there is evidence that negative returns are more likely to trigger
increases in correlation than positive returns. In fact, as we explore
both of these points, we find a model that points to a distinction in the
behavior of the cross-sectional kurtosis depending upon how correlated
individual volatility shocks to each stock are. In other words, we shall
see that the behavior is slightly different depending upon whether
the volatility shock is of a global (exogenous) nature, or whether it is
more stock-specific or endogenous (for example due to a large negative
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Figure 13: Intra day cross-sectional kurtosis for the time period around May
6 2010, sampled at 5 minute intervals. Nothing special happens at the onset
of the Flash Crash.
return to one or a few stocks in the market).
We now study the first of these questions, namely if there is asym-
metry in the correlation dynamics. To this end we calculate the fol-
lowing quantity
L(τ) =< AIC(t+ τ)r(t) > (5)
which we shall refer to as a correlation-leverage quantity. If negative
returns precede an increase in the correlation AIC more frequently
than do positive returns, then this quantity will be negative. Indeed,
a plot of the correlation-leverage according to Eq(5) is shown in Figure
15, confirming that negative returns tend to precede increases in AIC.
In fact, this result is not surprising. Bouchaud et al already showed
[17] that there is s leverage effect present for returns in that negative
returns precede increases in volatility. Also, [8] discusses a similar
result.
Within the framework of our understanding in the current con-
text, it therefore makes sense that if negative returns imply higher
volatility, then that should imply higher correlations because volatil-
ity and the correlation dynamics are intricately related. This is for
example illustrated in Figure 16 where AIC is plotted as a function
of market volatility (defined as the absolute value of the market re-
turn on a daily time scale). Notice that, as volatility increases, AIC
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Figure 14: A histogram of the cross-sectional average sum of signs has a
bi-modal distribution after the Flash Crash, indicating that even on this 5
minute time scale, correlations have increased and there are signs of panic.
grows until it saturates around 1. It is quite obvious from this plot
that, on average, low volatility corresponds to low correlations, and
high volatility corresponds to higher correlations. This plot is also
consistent with the phase transition model of correlations which we
proposed in [1]: For volatilities below a critical threshold, correlations
are close to zero, with noise. This corresponds to the linear behavior
at small volatilities. After a critical volatility, the correlations take on
high values, hence the flatter region at higher volatilities.
Note that this interpretation is a contemporary one, and also could
be turned on it’s head: One could say that if AIC is large then the mar-
ket volatility will be larger since the magnitude of the sum of returns
across stocks will likely be larger if all stocks go up or down in the
same direction. Nevertheless, if fits nicely with our phenomenological
description of what is going on in the system.
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Figure 15: The correlation-leverage of Eq(5) for daily time-scales., well-fit by
L(τ) = −A exp−τ/T with A = 0.01 and T = 18.4. Negative returns imply
higher correlations. A similar result is found on intra-day time scales.
6 A model: skew, volatility feedback,
and correlation dynamics
The stock returns for each instrument across time is modeled by [18]
dyit = σ
i
tdω
i
t (6)
where yi is the log stock price of the i-th stock, ωi is a zero mean
Gaussian noise with unit variance, and
(σit)
2 = σ20[1 +
∞∑
τ=1
gτ
σ2τ
(yit − yit=τ )2 + κ
∞∑
τ=1
gτ
σ
√
τ
(yit − yit−τ )] (7)
with gτ = g/τ
α. The parameters of the model are g, κ and α. Con-
ditions for stability plus values which calibrate to real returns are
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Figure 16: AIC as a function of market volatility. The scale is in terms
of standard deviations. Notice that for volatilities greater than roughly 1
standard deviation, correlations are consistently higher than for volatilies
less than 1 standard deviation.
discussed extensively in [18]. The feedback in the model is controlled
by g, the power law memory in time is related to α, and the skew
and leverage effect relating negative returns and volatility depends on
κ. This model is motivated by the statistical feedback model that
we presented in [20, 21, 22] and is very similar to the Figarch models
[23, 24, 25].
For an ensemble of N stocks, we assume that the ωi, i = 1, · · · , N
are correlated proportional to AIC = s2, where S is the average sum
of signs cross-sectionally. The empirical data that we showed in Figure
16 tells us that
|S| = f(σM ) + Ft (8)
where σM is the market volatility. One possible phenomenological
manifestation of this relationship is the phase transition model which
we proposed in [1]
ds
dt
= −as− bs3 + Ft (9)
with a = α(σc−σM ), b a scaling parameter, and σc a critical volatility
level. In this model, S can be thought of as jiggling around in a
potential well. When σM < σc, that well only has one minimum at
0, so |S| fluctuates around that point. If σM > σc, the potential
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Figure 17: Market returns with periods of panic. At time 700, an endoge-
nous shock is induced with an extreme negative return. At time 1150, an
exogenous volatility shock is applied. At around time 1800, a spontaneous
endogenous shock appears.
well attains two new minima at ±√(a). |S|becomes non-zero and
correlations are high: Stocks tend to move up or down together in
accordance, which is manifested in a bimodal distribution of S.We say
that there is a phase transition as σM crosses above the critical value,
since the collective behavior of the stocks is qualitatively very different.
This type of phase-transition model is based on the dynamics and
theories of self-organizing systems as discussed in [26].
The market volatility σM can increase to values larger than σc due
to either i) exogenous jumps (news) affecting all stocks so that σ0
becomes σ0 + σshock, or ii) endogenous, idiosyncratic jumps which are
more stock-specific and can for example be induced by a large negative
return.
Finally we would like to point out that our model is for the scenario
where the universe of traded instruments consists of stocks, mainly. If
one for example includes ETFs in a significant volume to the universe,
correlations can be high even without panic but then one would expect
that dispersion is lower [27]. In that case, the stock dynamics could
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Figure 18: Dispersion increases during all three periods of panic.
be written as
dyi = d(ETF ) + σi(t)dωi, (10)
where the correlations among the ωi still may follow Eq(9). But be-
cause of the ETF exposure, there would be a necessarily high corre-
lation among all stock returns if the volume of traded ETF is high,
which is actually the present case with about 9% market volume in
this instrument.
7 Simulations
To illustrate our model in a qualitative fashion we ran a simulation
using Eq(6) and Eq(7) as the basis for the dynamics of each stock.
Here, the feedback parameter g = 0.35, the skew parameter κ = 0.15
and α = 1.15. The base volatility was chosen at σ0 = 0.20, and we
included only up until N = 100 terms in the volatility feedback term.
Our goal was not to calibrate to real data here, but rather to attain a
process which qualitatively captures the main stylized facts that real
stock returns exhibit over time. For the cross sectional dynamics we
modeled the correlations across stocks at a given time point with the
18
Figure 19: Kurtosis decreases drastically only when the panic was induced
by an exogenous volatility shock (around time 1150).
phenomenological equation Eq(9) using b = 0.01 and Ft = 0.1ν˜ where
ν˜ is a standard Brownian noise. The critical volatility σc was taken to
equal one standard deviation of the historical market volatility, itself
measured as the squared variation of historical returns over the past
100 time points. At each time point in the simulation, an estimate
of the current market volatility was obtained as the absolute value of
the recent market return.
In this setting, the current volatility can change either due to a
”global” shock such that σ0 effectively becomes σ0+σshock, or due to a
large negative return in one or more stocks. The first case corresponds
to a market wide exogenous fear factor, such as happened around the
Lehman collapse. The second case better describes an endogenous,
event driven panic such as happened in the Flash Crash.
In our simulations we can induce both types of volatility shocks,
and look to see the effect on the resulting cross-sectional properties
which we have discussed in the previous sections. Figure 17 shows the
simulated market returns, with three periods of panic (one induced by
a negative return of 4 standard deviations magnitude at time 700, one
induced by a volatility shock of size σshock = 0.4 at time 1150, and
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Figure 20: A plot of AIC versus market volatility.
one which occurred spontaneously toward the end).
The first period of panic was induced by a large endogenous neg-
ative return in one stock, which propagated up to the market level.
The dispersion increased as exhibited in Figure 18, while the kurtosis
(Figure 19) did not decrease but was instead somewhat positively cor-
related with the dispersion. This case mimics the scenario of the Flash
Crash. On the other hand, as also shown in the plots of Figure 18 and
Figure 19, the dispersion and kurtosis of the region where the panic
was induced by a global exogenous shock exhibit a strong negative
correlation, as in for example the crash of October 2008. In addition,
the dynamics spontaneously induced another period of panic which
follows the statistics of an endogenous shock. In all cases, histograms
of S are bimodal during the times of panic, and unimodal in normal
times, as already shown in [1]. Furthermore, a plot of AIC versus
volatility (Figure 20) is qualitatively similar to our empirical observa-
tions. And finally, the simulated data exhibits a correlation-leverage
effect much as that observed empirically (see Figure 21).
8 Conclusions
We have explored the dynamics of a simple correlation statistic, namely
the sum of signs of cross-sectional return, or equivalently, its square
which is closely related to the cross-sectional sign correlation. We
have shown that this quantity exhibits a memory over time reinforc-
ing the idea that correlations tend to cluster, although by far not as
notably as volatility. We also showed that there is a kind of leverage-
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Figure 21: The correlation leverage effect in our simulations.
correlation effect (akin to the leverage effect between volatility and
negative returns), in that negative returns precede an increase in the
correlations. In a previous paper we had studied statistical signatures
of market panic on daily time scales, and had found that in such in-
stances, market volatility rises, as does cross-sectional dispersion and
correlation among stocks, while the cross-sectional kurtosis exhibited
a marked decrease. We proposed that the drastic change in the cross-
sectional dynamics of markets in a panic situation can be modeled as
a phase transition, induced by an external volatility shock.
Here we extended this study to intra-day time scales and found
that all signatures of panic remain the same, except that the kurtosis
does not necessarily decrease during a crash. This was exemplified
by an analysis of the cross-sectional dynamics on and around May
6, 2010, when markets crashed only to rebound fully shortly after,
hence coined the Flash Crash. The subtle difference in the cross-
sectional distribution of stock returns during this crash as opposed
to for example the panic of October 2008 can be attributed to the
source of the volatility shock which induces the crash. In particular
we found that if the shock is the result of an endogenous, idiosyncratic
behavior, such as an unusually large negative return in one or more
stocks, then market volatility, dispersion and correlations will increase,
but kurtosis doesn’t necessarily decrease. This can be understood as
follows. If the volatility shock is global or market wide, as would be
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the case from an exogenous news event, then the individual volatilities
of each stock will become more similar, which leads cross-sectionally to
a more Gaussian distribution, and low kurtosis.. On the other hand,
if the volatility shock affects just a few stocks, then the cross-sectional
distribution reflects that of an ensemble of random variables each with
a different volatility, yielding a high kurtosis. Interestingly we also
found that in general kurtosis and dispersion are not strongly anti-
correlated on intra-day timescales, even for periods such as late 2008
where they exhibit a strong negative correlation on daily timescales.
This difference would be attributed to overnight price moves which,
in the framework of our model, would impound globally correlated,
exogenous volatility into the system.
We proposed a model based on [1] that includes skew in the dynam-
ics for each individual stock and were able to reproduce in simulations
the basic dynamics and statistical properties of these two different
sources of panic, including the leverage-correlation effect which we
found. The work presented here is entirely qualitative in nature, and
a future study should attempt to calibrate the model to empirical
data. This could be useful to increase our understanding, but also
for predictive purposes which could have many applications for risk
control and the management of extreme correlation events.
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